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By revisiting the eruptions of Taal in 1911, Hibok-Hibok in 1951, and 
Pinatubo in 1991, this article interrogates Greg Bankoff’s argument that 
“cultures of disaster” in the Philippines produce “coping mechanisms” 
manifested in public apathy and the state’s failure at mitigation. It argues 
for historical contingency as illustrated by the relative success at disaster 
mitigation in Pinatubo’s case, despite extreme challenges. It highlights 
the warning system in which the Aeta who lived on Mount Pinatubo, along 
with volcanologists and other key actors, played crucial roles. The Aeta’s 
nonscientific perspective was not an obstacle to understanding risks and 
taking defensive action.
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P
ublished in 2003, Greg Bankoff’s book, Cultures of Disaster, 
stands out as a landmark publication in disaster studies, 
especially in relation to the Philippines. The book contains 
much valuable information on the different kinds of disasters 
from natural hazards that the country has experienced over the 
centuries. Bankoff (2003, 152) makes the incisive observation that disasters, 
far from being simply meteorological or seismic phenomena, “are embedded 
in the political structures, economic systems and social orders of the societies 
in which they take place. Above all, they are historical events in that hazards 
are diachronic happenings, they occur as part of a sequence or process that 
determines a particular person’s or people’s vulnerability.” Disasters are to 
be understood in their social and historical context. As part of this context, 
Bankoff argues that a highly disaster-prone country such as the Philippines 
has undergone “cultural adaptation” as a way of living—a “frequent life 
experience”—that enables people to “come to terms with hazard in such 
a way that disasters are not regarded as abnormal situations but as quite the 
reverse, as a constant feature of life” (ibid., 153, 179).
Filipinos are said to have adapted to disasters through the “normalisation 
of threat,” which in turn has been “a significant factor influencing the 
development of cultures in the Philippines” (ibid., 163). These cultures 
contain “coping mechanisms that have evolved in order to permit communities 
to come to terms with the constancy of hazard and to mitigate the worst effects 
of disaster” (ibid.). These coping mechanisms “are visible in the historical 
records of architectural adaptations, agricultural practices and migration 
patterns and in the popular manifestations of calculated risk assessment, 
resignation, mysticism, self-reliance and reciprocity common to many cultures 
in the archipelago” (ibid., 178). The resulting practices “represent a distinctive 
pattern of activity and behaviour among Filipinos” (ibid., 163).
ambiguities and Prevarications in cultures of disaster
Amid its path-breaking and provocative insights, Cultures of Disaster contains 
several prevarications and dilemmas. Because of the work’s importance, its 
propositions require serious interrogation. The “cultural manifestations” of 
“coping mechanisms” (ibid., 170) are on the surface contradictory, and as 
such call for conceptual refinement and fine-tuning. 
However, it should be made clear that, as Bankoff (2016a) admits, 
since completing the manuscript for the book about fifteen years ago, his 
“thoughts have developed quite considerably since then.” His subsequent 
work has sought “to stress the dynamism” of what he calls civic community 
and civil society in the Philippines (Bankoff 2016b; cf. Bankoff 2007, 2012, 
2015). Nonetheless, the book remains the locus classicus of disaster studies 
in the country, as evinced by the citations in virtually every article in this 
special double issue. For this reason this article’s engagement is with the text 
of Cultures of Disaster.
In his book, Bankoff (2003, 167) asserts that “bahala na,” which is 
“usually, if somewhat erroneously, translated as simply fatalism,” “is equally 
an active calculation of the odds as it is a passive sense of acceptance of one’s 
fate.” This assertion may well be valid, but it raises many questions. What view 
of reality explains the tensions that hold these two contradictory positions 
together? Does “bahala na” involve action and inaction simultaneously, or 
is it a case that some situations call for action while others require inaction 
but explicitly justified in each case as “bahala na”? What notions of risk, 
vulnerability, and capacity to respond to threats are implicated in “bahala na”? 
More broadly, how does one square calculated risk taking with resignation? 
When does one respond to hazards and disasters by becoming self-reliant, 
and when does one immerse one’s self in mysticism? When is fatalism a 
predisposition to inaction, and when is it a search for meaning?
Despite the fact that adaptation is a social process, the formulation about 
cultures of disaster inadvertently tends to be static and ultimately ahistorical: 
cultures of disaster end up being depicted as basically unchanging. Bankoff’s 
(ibid., 176) discussion of the eruption of Mayon Volcano in 1897 as having 
been seen as God’s punishment is followed by the assertion that “such 
ideas have not lost currency with the passing of time.” However, rather 
than presenting data on people’s views of Mayon’s eruptions at present, 
the discussion veers away to floods in Central Luzon in the 1970s and in 
Ormoc in 1991. Although people’s views of the latter events may indeed 
evince notions of divine retribution, we are left to wonder if people who live 
in proximity to Mayon still subscribe to such notions.1 Data from the same 
location where there has been a recurrence of the same event will allow us 
to determine if, in the given context, such views do not lose currency with 
the passage of time. 
In 1934 Fr. Miguel Selga of the Manila Observatory described tifonitis 
as “a pathological state owing to nervous overstimulation produced by the 
frequency or extraordinary intensity of typhoons” (ibid., 174–75), which 
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leads Bankoff to impute an unchanging history of mass hysteria in response 
to recurring typhoons. Tifonitis, which Father Selga theorized as arising from 
“the passing of five strong typhoons in quick succession between 15 October 
and 10 December 1934” (ibid., 175), indicates, according to Bankoff, a 
generic state of mind “referred to as nasisiraan ng ulo, the fear of losing 
control over one’s life and of one’s destiny, perhaps, even over one’s mind” 
due to the “fickleness of a hazardous world, the unpredictability of when a 
disaster might occur and the element of chance as to whom it might affect” 
(ibid., 173–74). Which types of individuals and social groups are vulnerable 
to this mental state? Is it a mass phenomenon? Do they recover from the 
trauma? If this is a protracted condition given the “fickleness of a hazardous 
world,” how then does adaptation, or living with risks and disasters that, as 
Bankoff (ibid., 163) puts it, “mitigate[s] the worst effects of disaster,” happen? 
From tifonitis to nasisiraan ng ulo, Cultures of Disaster provides a blanket 
portrayal of seemingly static perceptions and aberrant behavioral patterns of 
Filipinos, which renders its formulation about cultures of disaster prone to 
essentialist thinking. Although the author probably did not intend to do so, 
Philippine culture is reduced to a pathological state.2
Even as people adapt to disasters, Bankoff suggests, they also remain 
fatalistic at the same time. They prepare for disasters, yet they know they 
cannot do much about it. They hear government advisories about the weather, 
but they do not believe these warnings and think that “government agencies 
could do little to reduce the damage caused by natural forces” (ibid., 171). 
There appears to be a twinning in the lack of efficacy of self/society as well 
as of the state in mitigating disasters. The lack of efficacy translates to lack of 
confidence and trust in the government. “The concept of bahala na has its 
political parallel in the degree to which the Filipino public lack confidence 
in the government’s ability to protect its citizens” (ibid.).
typhoon advisories, Public trust, and apathy
Bankoff pursues the issue of the public’s distrust of government by discussing 
reactions to the storm warning system of the Philippine Atmospheric, 
Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) 
as gauged by survey data collected in the early 1990s. He notes that the 
agency’s “weather forecasts have a popular reputation for being notoriously 
inaccurate and undependable” (ibid.). Studies of tornado warnings suggest 
that the frequency of false alarms and missed events heighten the perception 
of inaccuracy that corresponds to less trust in the entity that provides public 
advisories, which in turn diminishes the likelihood that people will take 
protective action (Simmons and Sutter 2009; Ripberger et al. 2015). 
However, Bankoff (2003, 171; 2004, 107) does not dwell on the 
issue of accuracy (which calls for an examination of the state of scientific 
expertise and instruments of PAGASA) because the discussion shifts to the 
comprehensibility of storm warnings: “it became clear that local people had 
problems comprehending weather bulletins and appreciating their urgency.” 
In other words, the issue was transposed into a communication problem, to 
which PAGASA responded by modifying its warning system.3 To find out the 
public’s reception of the modified system, PAGASA commissioned the opinion 
polling firm Social Weather Stations (SWS) to collect survey data using a set 
of closed-ended questions. In the paragraphs that follow, we revisit briefly the 
survey data as interpreted by SWS and by Bankoff to make the point that the 
proposition about cultures of disaster rests on rather shaky ground.
After presenting the survey data, Gerardo Sandoval (1994, 6) of the 
SWS concluded,
After three survey rounds, public satisfaction with PAGASA’s 
performance has remained high. As the 1992 survey data reveal, 
people feel that storm signals issued by PAGASA are considered 
adequate to avoid danger and help prevent destruction brought by 
typhoons. The issued signals are also considered as a reliable basis 
to decide on whether or not to evacuate from their respective areas.
It would appear that the public trusted PAGASA’s storm warnings 
in a way that would make them take appropriate action. Despite these 
results, Bankoff (2003, 171; 2004, 107–8) stressed that “trust in the efficacy 
of PAGASA remains low,” citing the finding that “49 per cent of people 
considered government agencies could do little to reduce damage caused 
by natural forces.”
Actually respondents were asked two very similar questions about 
what ordinary people and the government could do about the harm that 
storms inflict; the 49 percent cited by Bankoff referred to those who said 
government could do little, while 47 percent said that citizens too could do 
little about the “destruction” (kapahamakan) caused by typhoons, a matter 
deemed to be “in the hands of God” (Sandoval 1994, 4–5, 8–9). In other 
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words, just under half of the respondents thought that neither the people 
nor the state could do anything about the kapahamakan (misfortune, misery, 
disaster, injury, accident) wrought by typhoons. Indeed, the question could 
be interpreted as asking if anyone could temper the fury of typhoons—which 
could raise issues about the survey design’s validity. 
What is interesting is Bankoff’s (2003, 172; 2004, 108) succeeding 
assertion based on these data: “The result is a population inured and 
apathetic to disaster and a political system that lacks the will to make long-
term plans.” Both the state and the citizenry are depicted as locked in paralysis 
by cultures of disaster. The original proposition that “the Filipino public lack 
confidence in the government’s ability to protect its citizens” (Bankoff 2003, 
171) has progressed to a thesis about a total loss of efficacy to do anything, 
a state of apathy, which could be deemed a societal “coping mechanism” 
in response to the frequency and pervasiveness of cyclonic storms. Not only 
does it simplify the situation, but the proposition also leaves little room for 
the possibility that societies, as well as scientific methods, can learn from the 
past and evolve in time.
In the concluding chapter, the book’s ambivalence comes to the fore. 
To what extent does an ecology that is so prone to disasters shape human 
behavior? Surely the environment must be a determinative force? Bankoff 
hedges his answer. “Of course,” he admits, “the extent to which recurrent 
environmental forces are accorded significance in determining aspects of 
people’s behaviour is fraught with conceptual and definitional problems and 
is simply ‘unprovable’ in the final event” (ibid., 179). He then takes cover by 
avowing that “the degree to which the frequency and magnitude of natural 
hazard may be responsible for influencing certain characteristic features of 
behaviour common to most Filipino cultures is certainly intriguing” (ibid., 
179–80, italics added).
In effect he asks: Are there really cultures of disaster? He provides his 
own answer that brings us back to PAGASA and the storm warning system:
Perhaps the strongest recognition that a particular ‘culture’ exists 
in the Philippines is suggested by the puzzlement evident in the 
meteorological survey independently commissioned by PAGASA on 
the effectiveness of its typhoon warning system that it had made 
considerable efforts to improve. On the one hand, the results of the 
questionnaires clearly indicated that the agency’s revised storm 
warnings were now considered comprehensible, reliable and adequate 
to avoid danger and prevent destruction. But a substantial proportion 
of Filipinos were still fatalistic about their or their government’s 
ability to limit damage caused by these physical events, believing 
that power over the number of deaths and the degree of devastation 
rested instead with divine providence. (ibid., 181)
With the public regarding typhoon advisories as “comprehensible, 
reliable and adequate to avoid danger and prevent destruction,” yet believing 
that destruction is foreordained and little or nothing can be done about it 
results in a tension that is also the evidence that a culture of disaster probably 
exists. Bankoff leaves us with a puzzle.4
Disasters as Contingent Events
A solution to Bankoff’s conundrum is to rephrase the question away from 
trying to determine whether or not cultures of disaster exist in the Philippines. 
Rather, we may ask: Under what conditions do people choose inaction and 
resignation in response to state advisories? Or, put positively, under what 
conditions do people take action and adopt defensive measure as a result 
of state advisories? The powerful but often misinterpreted word “culture” is 
intentionally avoided in this reformulation because of how easily it incites 
interpretations in homogenizing and static terms.5
Reframing the question in this way compels us to view events in their 
proper historical context: to treat societies as dynamic, changeable, and 
open to contingencies. (In fact, Bankoff [2012] applies a nuanced analysis 
of contingent historical factors in his study of a typhoon-induced flood in 
San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, in September 1887.) This reframing should also 
make us realize that societies are not homogeneous; given the diversity of 
views, predispositions, and notions of risk, people’s responses to warnings 
will not be uniform even in a single locality. Moreover, dealing with disasters 
is subject to contestation. Distrust of institutions and scientific expertise is 
real but not immutable and certainly not insurmountable. Organized action 
can minimize the severity of disasters, without necessarily disregarding or 
disparaging nonscientific perspectives. It is possible to communicate scientific 
information in ways that make people understand the risks. As Loh Kah 
Seng (2014) has shown, sections of the urban poor population appropriate 
knowledge from technical experts on flooding in the Marikina Valley, 
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although the process of adapting “modernist” responses is contingent upon 
local factors, such as the mediating role of nongovernment organizations 
(NGOs) and the local community’s own processes of coming to terms with 
the worsening inundations.
Additionally, the hazards themselves are not uniform and cannot be 
homogenized because they vary in terms of predictability, detectability, 
certainty, lead time, duration of impact, and visibility (Mileti and Sorensen 
1990, 6-1). Thus there can be no single, generic warning system for all 
types of hazards, a fact that confounds the projected outcomes from any 
single advisory. The diversity in the types of hazards compels a nuanced 
and differentiated analysis based on contextual factors and circumstances, 
as suggested above. In this light, an investigation of specific historical cases 
can reveal the dynamic processes involved in negotiating information and 
advisories on forecasted events, with outcomes and public responses far from 
being predetermined. In seeking to demonstrate this alternative approach, this 
article focuses on advisories to the public, specifically concerning volcanic 
eruptions. In fact, Bankoff (2003, 162) uses the phrase “in the shadow of the 
volcano” as the metaphor for living with natural hazards. However, it must 
be emphasized that, although seemingly constituting a single type of disaster 
risk, volcanic eruptions are not all the same: some may have a long or short 
prediction time, and some impending eruptions can be more easily detected 
than others (Mileti and Sorensen 1990, 6-9–6-10).
In applying this alternative framework, we may ask: How have Filipinos 
responded to the threat of volcanic eruptions? Specifically, under what 
circumstances have they put themselves in harm’s way, and under what 
circumstances have they taken protective action? What has been the role 
of state advisories in these eruptions? To answer these questions, this article 
revisits three main events: the eruption of Taal in 1911, Hibok-Hibok in 1951, 
and Pinatubo in 1991. The bulk of the analysis focuses on Mount Pinatubo’s 
eruption, when huge casualties were avoided—a point muted in Bankoff’s 
(ibid., 69–72) main discussion of Pinatubo’s eruption, although he remarks 
that the state volcanology agency “earned considerable public praise” and its 
director “much accolade for his expert monitoring of the Pinatubo situation” 
(ibid., 84–85; cf. Bankoff 2004, 106).
This study relies on published documentary sources, which are a valuable 
treasure trove of information about these volcanic eruptions. These sources 
include, for Taal and Hibok-Hibok, news features and scientific reports. In 
Pinatubo’s case, scientists produced detailed studies that were documented 
intentionally to benefit the wider epistemic community and published in 
a formidable and hefty 3.8-kilogram volume titled Fire and Mud edited by 
Christopher Newhall and Raymundo Punongbayan (1996). This volume 
includes useful accounts of the scientists’ experiences, which, although written 
from the strategic position they occupied in this event, are very useful for 
being comprehensive, reliable, and reflexive. A major limitation of this study 
concerns my inability to conduct interviews with the Aeta and the various 
groups that worked with them. Providentially the stories of several Aeta survivors 
were documented in 1993 and 1995 and published in Hiromu Shimizu’s 
(2001) The Orphans of Pinatubo. Missionary nun Emma Fondevilla (1991) 
also recorded the experiences of the Aeta in her community and published 
in Eruption and Exodus: Mt. Pinatubo and the Aytas of Zambales. Enough 
insights can be gleaned and pieced together from the available published 
sources to appreciate the contingencies involved in each of these eruptions.
taal’s eruption in 1911
While the Volcanological Survey of Indonesia was established in 1920 
under Dutch rule (van Padang 1983, 3, 23) and despite the location of the 
Philippines on the Ring of Fire and its history of volcanic eruptions, neither 
the Spanish nor American rulers of the archipelago set up a separate entity 
to study and monitor the country’s volcanoes. The Jesuits set up the Manila 
Observatory in 1865, which was made into a colonial state institution in 1894 
and subsequently reorganized by the Americans into the Philippine Weather 
Bureau in 1901. The bureau was concerned mainly with meteorological and 
seismological conditions.
Probably the country’s most devastating volcanic eruption under the 
watch of the United States was that of Taal, which culminated on 30 January 
1911. The official death toll was placed at 1,335 persons, although this 
number probably did not account for all who perished; the eruption also 
obliterated six or seven villages on Pulo Volcan, the volcano island (Saderra 
Masó 1911, 18; Pratt 1911, 81; cf. Hargrove 1991, 161–76). The Spanish 
Jesuit Fr. Miguel Saderra Masó (1911, 18), assistant director of the Weather 
Bureau, wrote, “The appalling number of victims is doubly painful if we 
compare it with the exceedingly small death list of the great eruption in 
1754. It would seem that then nobody lived on Volcano Island.” In 1911 the 
migrants who had settled on Volcano Island did not or could not interpret 
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the volcano’s tremors and emissions as warnings of an impending eruption, 
and so they did not flee to safety. Their reaction stood in stark contrast to 
those in nearby towns, who were in a state of panic as stated below. Evidently 
no local or external entity provided any advisories.
Fr. Saderra Masó (ibid., 26) ended his report by highlighting what he 
considered a “very remarkable” circumstance:
For two entire days preceding the great eruption, the volcano was 
rumbling and ejecting mud and ashes, while the earth trembled 
incessantly; and yet, neither on Volcano Island nor in the nearest 
villages of the western shores was there to be found a single person 
capable of informing the authorities or inducing his neighbors to 
take some precautionary measures! It is hoped that this terrible 
experience will serve as an incitement to take the necessary steps 
in order to avoid the recurrence of, or at least to lessen the effects of 
similar disasters in the future, as far as this can be done by human 
intelligence, energy, and foresight.
Yet, other accounts suggest that members of the public were sending advisories 
to state officials, to no avail. On 28 January morning, the American who worked 
as tourist guide to the volcano had cabled the Bureau of Science that Taal was 
in eruption (Worcester 2012, 334). “Meanwhile various other telegrams had 
been received at Manila, stating that a huge column of black ‘smoke’ had been 
pouring out of the crater since early morning, and that sinister subterranean 
rumblings were causing panic among the people of the neighboring towns” 
(ibid.). Given the lament of Fr. Saderra Masó, apparently no one in the colonial 
government took notice of the telegrams that were sent at least two days prior 
to the worst explosion. The information sent to the Bureau of Science would 
appear not to have reached the Weather Bureau, and neither did the latter warn 
the public despite the series of earthquakes its observatory had recorded and 
traced to the region of Taal days before the eruption.
In his report the American governor-general emphasized humanitarian 
assistance to the victims, but made no admission of the state’s lack of 
discernment and no mention of the mitigation of similar disasters in the 
future (Philippine Commission 1912a, 27).6 Perhaps the summary statement 
of Wallace Pratt (1911, 81) of the Bureau of Science was indicative of the 
colonial state’s vacillating response: “The magnitude of this eruption of Taal 
has been both exaggerated and belittled.” Secretary of the Interior Dean 
Worcester (1912, 353) also reported that “There was at the outset a woeful 
lack of appreciation of the magnitude of the calamity . . . both by the Manila 
public and by government officials, accustomed as they all were to greatly 
exaggerated first reports of the damage caused in the Philippine Islands by 
typhoons, conflagrations, earthquakes.”7
Worcester (ibid., 366) also raised the question, “What precautions should 
be taken to prevent future great loss of life?” He made two recommendations: 
(a) the “sweeping and absolute” prohibition of settlement on Volcano 
Island and (b) the establishment on Volcano Island and on the mainland of 
observation points to monitor “seismic disturbances” so that “timely warning” 
could be given (ibid., 367). By 1914 there was a “seismic and geophysic 
station at Ambulong, Taal” (Philippine Commission 1915, 119). By the 
1920s scientists of the Weather Bureau were observing volcanic activities 
not only of Taal in Batangas but also of Bulusan in Sorsogon and Mayon in 
Albay, using ambulant seismic instruments (Alvarez 2015, 3). However, the 
Weather Bureau was not particularly renowned for studying volcanoes. The 
fact that Taal remained quiet for over fifty years until its eruption in 1965 
and the country’s other active volcanoes were temporarily quiescent worked 
in the bureau’s favor.8
learning from hibok-hibok
Not until the eruption of Mount Hibok-Hibok on Camiguin Island on 4 
December 1951 did the Philippines find the impetus to set up an entity 
that would institutionalize the science of volcanology and issue warnings 
as well as impose preventive and mitigating measures. The number of 
casualties from Hibok-Hibok’s eruption could not be ascertained—perhaps 
1,000 to 3,000 people died from pyroclastic flows—as human remains could 
be retrieved only from the “less dangerous” zone (cf. Ty 1951, 4). About 
six months after the eruption, the state’s response was embodied in a novel 
legislation. Republic Act 766 creating the Commission on Volcanology was 
signed into law on 20 June 1952 (Philippine Congress 1952, 3216). 
Hibok-Hibok had erupted in 1948 with no casualties and again in 1950 
when 65 people were killed (Ty 1951, 4), a number that was not earthshaking. 
One could say that these eruptions were part of the “normal” threat that 
accompanied life in the shadow of a volcano. In these two earlier eruptions, 
the earth gave the usual telltale signs of an impending volcanic eruption, 
which alerted people to take precaution or leave its vicinity. However, in 
1951 local residents said they did not observe anything unusual. “Although 
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a thin cloud of grayish smoke wreathed its summit, the inhabitants of the 
locality felt no alarm. ‘It was a common sight and we had been so used 
to seeing it that we paid not the slightest attention to it any longer,’ said a 
farmer” who survived (ibid.). But at around 7:30 AM on 4 December the 
volcano erupted unexpectedly.
With a quaking blast [Hibok-Hibok] heaved its sulphurous stomach, 
tossed red-hot boulders bigger than a man across the northeastern 
portion of Camiguin, sent up clouds of red-hot ash and deadly chlorine. 
A torrent of glowing molten lava rolled in all directions. Three and 
a half miles away in Mambajao (pop. 21,000), the island’s capital 
and largest village, children on the way to school, women washing 
clothes, men on the way to their fields were buried in the rush of lava, 
burned to death by ashes or killed by gas. 
From the scene, TIME Correspondent Carlos Weber cabled this 
report: “The air was filled with the stench of decaying bodies and 
sulphur. For miles and miles there was no sign of life—just stony 
silence and the stripped, twisted forms of ash-grey men, women, 
children and dogs. In one corner of what used to be a hut, I saw 
17 bodies huddled together in death. Two, about eight or nine years 
old, were hugging each other. About 100 yards away was a carabao, 
bathed in ash and dead, but still standing. As I left, a chicken crossed 
my path. Its right side was grey and seared, the other side untouched. 
It was the only living thing I saw there.” (Time 1951)
In the next four days the volcano erupted four more times. Aggravating 
matters was the onslaught of a typhoon that passed by the island. Survivors 
were evacuated from Camiguin and brought to other islands on fishermen’s 
boats and military ships. Some refused to leave the island, the journalist 
explaining that they believed the eruption had been God-ordained (ibid.). 
Thousands, however, evacuated to safety, even if, I would surmise, they did 
not necessarily disavow their religious beliefs. Many left Camiguin for good 
(Ty 1951, 53).9
The eruption of Hibok-Hibok in 1951 was the first major volcanic 
disaster for the independent Philippines. It caused great consternation for 
the young republic, and apparently it led to the consensus that things could 
not go on in the old usual way, that things had to be done differently. This 
response was captured and institutionalized in the passage of the law that 
created the volcanology agency.10 The state’s response was facilitated by the 
fact that the science of volcanology had long been in existence, and therefore 
a scientific solution was well within the realm of possibility. Filipinos did 
not have to modify their conceptions of volcanic eruptions, many of which 
were informed by cosmological and magical beliefs. All it needed was 
for a section of society, mainly actors within the state, to take action and 
mobilize scientific expertise, which until then had been distributed within 
the state apparatus, and to centralize them into one agency dedicated to the 
monitoring of volcanoes.11 This entity was also authorized to take decisive 
action.
Republic Act 766, section 3, mandated the Commission on Volcanology 
to, in its words:
Investigate and conduct studies of all active Philippine 1. 
volcanoes;
Establish necessary facilities in order to predict their eruption in 2. 
advance, if possible;
Formulate in advance and in detail specific plans of action and of 3. 
relief in the event of the eruption of any volcano; 
Recommend to the President of the Philippines such measures 4. 
as may be necessary to protect life and property in areas which may 
be affected by volcanic eruptions, including the declaration of certain 
areas as closed to human habitation or subject to regulation; and
To perform such other duties as may be necessary to carry out 5. 
the purposes of this Act. (Philippine Congress 1952, 3215) 
Rather than resignation, helplessness, or fatalism, the language of the law 
clearly evoked a worldview that was determined to make human intervention 
spell a difference in the next volcanic eruption. But the “if possible” clause in 
the second item was a subtle admission that perfect prediction of an eruption 
was probably not possible. Still, there was the determination to do more than 
be left simply to the mercies of nature. The creation of the Commission on 
Volcanology participated in “the modernist aspiration of mitigation” (Head 
and Gibson 2012, 704). Society remained in the shadow of the volcano, but 
the volcano was also to be shadowed by the state.
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Pinatubo and disaster mitigation
Four decades later, state expertise on volcanology—the commission 
was reconstituted in 1982 into the Philippine Institute of Volcanology 
(PHIVOLC) and, with seismology added to it, became PHIVOLCS in 
1984 (Alvarez 2015)—would play a critical role in making the cataclysmic 
eruption of Mount Pinatubo from 12 to 15 June 1991 turn out to be far from 
being the deadliest. Pinatubo’s eruption is considered the largest ever to 
affect a densely populated area (around 500,000 people lived in the vicinity 
surrounding Pinatubo) and the second largest eruption in the twentieth 
century. As PHIVOLCS head Raymundo Punongbayan and colleagues 
(1996, 67) would admit subsequently, “most worrisome of all, we could see 
from the geologic record of Pinatubo that its previous eruptions were so large 
that a recurrence would threaten several hundred thousand unsuspecting 
people. The ingredients for a colossal disaster were on hand.” In the end, 
“The number of casualties at the height of the June 1991 eruptions was small 
(only 200 to 300) despite the violence of the explosions and the vastness of 
the area affected” (Tayag et al. 1996, 87). About 180 people were killed by 
roofs that collapsed from the weight of accumulated wet ash, exacerbated by 
the arrival of a typhoon; about 100 people died from various other causes, 
“including several tens from pyroclastic flows and another several tens from 
lahars” (Punongbayan et al. 1996, 81). Despite these deaths as well as severe 
problems in the relocation sites and the ensuing years of devastation from 
the lahars (cf. Bankoff 2003, 69–72, 97–102, 167–68), a colossal disaster had 
been averted.
The intervention of volcanologists was crucial, but it was not easy in the 
context of Pinatubo. Since the creation of the volcanology commission in 
1952 these experts had gradually established their reputation in cautioning 
the public in areas of the country with active volcanoes (Mayon, Bulusan, 
Taal, Hibok-Hibok, and Kanlaon), where a monitoring system had been 
in place and people had learned to appreciate the warnings issued by 
volcanologists. In Mayon’s case, for instance, decisive intervention by 
PHIVOLCS during the September 1984 eruption resulted in the evacuation 
from the danger zone of over 44,000 persons who were temporarily housed 
in forty-two evacuation centers, with no casualties reported despite houses 
being submerged and crops and fields extensively damaged by the volcano’s 
ejecta (UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs 1984). In contrast, in the 
vicinity surrounding Pinatubo there was no established credential for the 
volcanologists since Pinatubo had been dormant in the preceding 500 
years or so. Its eruptive history was unknown to most everyone. The Aeta 
communities on Mount Pinatubo had no oral tradition about an extant 
volcano, or if they had it had vanished through the centuries. As one Aeta 
declared, “Noon, hindi namin alam na ang Pinatubo ay bulkan. Hanggang 
noong umusok ang Pinatubo, may balita mula sa gobyerno na bulkan pala 
ang Pinatubo” (Previously, we did not know that Pinatubo was a volcano. 
Until Pinatubo began to smoke, there was news from the government 
that Pinatubo was after all a volcano) (Shimizu 2001, 154).12 In the case 
of Mayon, the Cagsawa Church ruins from the 1814 eruption stand as a 
perennial reminder of a past catastrophe. As Robert Tantingco (2011, 84) 
put it, “Unlike Bicolanos and Batangueños who grew up in the shadow of 
their respective volcanoes, there was nothing in their history that prepared 
Kapampangans, intellectually or psychologically, for a volcanic eruption.”
Given the protracted hiatus since Pinatubo’s last eruption, among local 
institutions and government entities there was no established system for 
dealing with an eruption and no learning curve for people living around 
Pinatubo. PHIVOLCS contemplated bringing in people living near 
recently active volcanoes such as Mayon and Taal to testify about volcanic 
eruptions, but in the end they did not and considered it “probably fortunate” 
as the visitors’ testimonies might have diminished the impending violence 
of Pinatubo, which the eruptions of Mayon and Taal in living memory 
could not match (Punongbayan et al. 1996, 78). Intervention was further 
complicated by the fact that, unlike Mayon, Bulusan, or Taal, Pinatubo 
straddled three provinces that contained numerous large cities and towns 
and hundreds of villages; the US and Philippine military bases; and festering 
local and national political disputes. 
Moreover, PHIVOLCS needed external assistance, which it received 
when a three-person team from the US Geological Survey “arrived in the 
Philippines on April 23, bringing with it a large cache of equipment that 
had been developed or purchased specifically for emergencies such as this” 
(ibid., 71). Amid the difficult decision to mount an observation point at 
Clark Air Base, because at that time “the Philippine and U.S. governments 
were locked in negotiations over renewal of the bases agreement, and . . . 
Philippine government agencies were not generally allowed to operate on 
Clark Air Base,” the team of volcanologists at Clark “made it a firm policy to 
remain strictly apolitical and to provide all volcano information first to the 
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[Philippine] Office of Civil Defense and then to all other interested parties 
including the U.S. Air Force” (ibid.).
Given its augmented expertise PHIVOLCS issued warnings, to which 
initially local people and officials would not give credence. To be able to 
predict an eruption was an attribute of the deities, and chief volcanologist 
Punongbayan was not perceived as godlike. As he reminisced in early 2005 
in a talk on the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami given at the Institute 
of Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila University, there were people 
who had asked him pointedly about his warnings concerning Pinatubo, 
“Ano ka? Diyos?” (What are you? God?). Nonetheless, as discussed below, 
a combination of events involving a host of groups, organizations, and 
communities resulted in the saving of more than 20,000 lives from “certain 
death” (ibid., 67).
As it turned out, as PHIVOLCS officials put it succinctly,
The management of the Pinatubo Volcano eruption crisis of 1991–92 
represents the highest point in the development of volcanic disaster 
mitigation in the Philippines. State-of-the-art volcano monitoring 
techniques and instruments were applied; the eruption was accurately 
predicted; hazards zonation maps for the anticipated destructive 
agents were prepared and disseminated about a month before the 
violent explosions; an alert and warning system was designed and 
implemented; and the disaster response machinery was prepared 
and mobilized on time. (Tayag and Punongbayan 1994, 2)
Evidently a major factor that helped minimize the number of casualties from 
Pinatubo’s eruption was a prompt and accurate public advisory system that, 
despite limitations, was remarkably successful, especially considering “the 
complex socioeconomic and political context in which the warnings had to 
compete for the attention of those at risk” (Punongbayan et al. 1996, 67).
the aeta and the initial trigger to Public warnings
Existing studies enable us to look back to the public’s participation and 
responses to warnings about the impending eruption of Pinatubo. Here we 
look at some of the key moments based on the four major components of a 
warning system: (1) the source and timing of the warning, (2) the warning 
message, (3) the warning transmission, and (4) the recipients’ response 
(Tayag et al. 1996, 87–88). The analysis is limited to the eruption in 1991 
and excludes subsequent small eruptions; it also excludes discussion on lahar 
and lahar warnings, which had shortcomings and went through a learning 
curve after the June 1991 eruptions.13
In Pinatubo’s case, the source and timing of the warning was most 
crucial. Significantly the initial trigger did not originate from scientists, 
who had not installed any monitoring device on Pinatubo. Rather it came 
from the indigenous Aeta who lived on its slopes (cf. Shimizu 1989). “They 
lived by the volcano’s rhythm, timing the planting and harvesting of their 
crops by the volume of steam rising continuously from a natural vent on 
the upper slope. A relatively dense steam meant a good harvest; a thin one 
augured a sparse yield” (Bautista 1996, 153). In early August 1990, the Aeta 
on the northwest side of Pinatubo noticed something unusual: “rumbling 
sounds, ground cracks, and a landslide covering about 2 to 3 ha on the upper 
northwest face of the volcano” (Punongbayan et al. 1996, 69). The Aeta did 
not know that what they had observed was related to volcanic origin, but they 
became sufficiently apprehensive. Some Aeta were members of Lubos na 
Alyansa ng mga Katutubong Ayta ng Sambales (LAKAS) or Negrito People’s 
Alliance of Zambales, a federation of Aeta village organizations on the 
western slope of Pinatubo formed in 1984 as an outgrowth of literacy classes 
held under the auspices of the Franciscan Missionaries of Mary (FMM) and 
formally registered with the SEC in 1987 (Fondevilla 1991, 9; Shimizu 2001, 
29). As such, they had an organization that passed on the information to a 
resident FMM nun, Sr. Emma Fondevilla, who then reported the matter to 
the PHIVOLCS. However, the agency’s response team did not relate these 
observations to volcanic activity, deeming them aftershocks of the strong 
tectonic earthquake along the Philippine fault, about 100 kilometers northeast 
of Pinatubo, that occurred on 16 July 1990 (Punongbayan et al. 1996, 69) and 
responsible for what was dubbed as the “Baguio earthquake” of 1990.
About eight months later from when they first observed something 
unusual, in late March 1991, the Aeta detected once more the unusual 
signs of the mountain’s restiveness through rumblings and tremors. Then 
on 2 April there were explosions and the opening of new steaming vents. 
Hundreds of panic-stricken Aeta fled their homes, converging in a village 12 
kilometers from the base of the mountain (Fondevilla 1991, 23). Again, Aeta 
members of LAKAS promptly reported their observations to the missionary 
nun, who in turn passed the information to PHIVOLCS on 3 April 1990 
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(Punongbayan et al. 1996, 69). Only then did PHIVOLCS begin to monitor 
Pinatubo and issue public advisories, although the agency’s volcanologists 
initially thought the observed activities to be “purely hydrothermal” and they 
labeled the volcano’s condition simply as “unstable” (ibid., 70–71). 
Because the scientists had no baseline data, they turned to the Aeta 
for help in understanding the unrest: “Aeta residents told us that nothing 
like this had happened within their memories or oral traditions, so, at least, 
we knew that the unrest was substantially greater than anything of the 
past several decades” (ibid., 72). Indeed, an elderly Aeta man confirmed, 
“Parating pumupunta ang taga-PHIVOLCS sa akin para makinig tungkol 
sa kasaysayan ng panahon” (Those from PHIVOLCS often come to me to 
listen to stories of old) (Shimizu 2001, 243). 
But even as the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) brought in 
their instruments to “establish, positively or negatively, the direct or indirect 
connection between the geothermal diggings and the hydrothermal explosion 
of Pinatubo,” the Aeta “asked forgiveness” from Namalyari, their deity, “for 
allowing men and machines to desecrate their mountain” (Fondevilla 1991, 
53). An Aeta man recalled that the PNOC had entered their area in 1984 by 
order of the government, but he felt that it was not right for them to interfere 
with Pinatubo (“hindi karapat-dapat na makialam sa Pinatubo”) (Shimizu 
2001, 111). In fact, some Aeta blamed the PNOC for triggering Pinatubo’s 
eruption (ibid., 141–42).
This critical juncture is an object lesson that any “culture of disaster” 
that might have prevailed among the Aeta did not pose an insurmountable 
barrier to disaster preparedness, particularly in relaying critical information 
that, back in 1911, Fr. Saderra Masó had identified as of utmost importance. 
On the contrary, it was not so much a “culture of disaster” but the existence 
of a critical network linking the Aeta’s LAKAS to PHIVOLCS, with the 
FMM serving as a strategic intermediary node that enabled “indigenous 
knowledge” to interface with scientific expertise, benefiting the latter and 
rescuing the former.
warning message, transmission, and Public responses
In areas with actives volcanoes, warnings about an impending eruption would 
be transmitted locally through the area’s Disaster Coordinating Council 
(DCC), with a separate transmission system to national offices (Tayag et 
al. 1996, 91). In Pinatubo’s case, “warning messages were formulated at 
PHIVOLCS’ main office and transmitted simultaneously through the DCC 
hierarchy, major national and local newspapers, radio and television stations, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and directly to the endangered 
inhabitants” (ibid.).
The alert scheme adopted on 13 May 1991 utilized qualitative criteria 
as follows:
Alert
level
CriteriA interPretAtion
no alert Background; quiet no eruption in foreseeable future
1 low-level seismicity, other unrest Magmatic, tectonic, or 
hydrothermal disturbance; no 
eruption imminent
2 Moderate level of seismicity, other 
unrest with positive evidence for 
involvement of magma
Probable magmatic intrusion; could 
eventually lead to an eruption
3 relatively high and increasing 
unrest including numerous b-type 
earthquakes; accelerating ground 
deformation, increased vigor of 
fumaroles, gas emissions
If trend of increasing unrest 
continues, eruption possible within 
2 weeks
4 Intense unrest, including harmonic 
tremor and (or) many “long-period” 
(low-frequency) earthquakes
Eruption possible within 24 hours
5 Eruption in progress Eruption in progress
Source: Punongbayan et al. 1996, 73; Tayag et al. 1996, 90
The intent was to have a warning system that was “simple enough for laymen 
to use for crisis decisions” but not to “promise a specific prediction,” given 
the paucity of baseline data (Punongbayan et al. 1996, 72). The warning 
system
simply noted increasing levels of unrest and correspondingly 
decreasing assurances that an eruption would not occur within a 
specified time period. Phrasing like “eruption possible within 2 weeks” 
was chosen carefully to mean that unrest had risen to such a level 
that an eruption might occur within that period. Perhaps predictably, 
the mass media and the general public misread the intent of the 
wording and concluded, first, that an eruption would occur 2 weeks 
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from the date of the warning, and later, after our explanation, that 
an eruption would occur sometime within the 2 weeks following the 
warning. The intended distinction between descriptions of unrest and 
predictions vanished. In retrospect, use of the Pilipino “ma’aaring 
mangyari” (“might occur”) would have been clearer than the English 
“possible.” (ibid., 73; cf. Tayag et al. 1996, 98)
In any event, there was something intuitive about the increasing alert 
levels. “Even though many officials misunderstood the subtleties of the alert 
levels, they understood clearly that Level 3 was more serious than Level 2 
and required urgent preparations, Level 4 was more serious than Level 3 
and, for people living near the volcano, required evacuation, and Level 5 was 
as serious as we could get” (Punongbayan et al. 1996, 73).
Although “multipath warning transmission” was potentially confusing, 
in Pinatubo’s case the warning messages were consistent, speedy, and 
comparatively effective. 
The 1991 survey showed that 71 percent of the 234 respondents 
[who lived in the danger zones] knew of the impending eruption 
before June 9, 1991, the date on which Alert Level 5 was issued, 
either through their own observation (9 percent) or through their own 
observation and forewarning from PHIVOLCS, media, local officials, 
or other people (62 percent). Before June 12, the date of the first 
large explosive events, 82 percent of the respondents knew of the 
danger. (Tayag et al. 1996, 92)
That 18 percent had no idea of the danger prior to the 12 June eruption 
indicated deficiencies in the warning system. Nonetheless, the advisories 
reached the vast majority. 
Importantly the survey responses suggested that the residents were not 
passive recipients of the volcanic warnings for they actively processed the 
information that reached them. At least one month before the first major 
eruption in June 1991, the information that Pinatubo was a long-dormant 
volcano had been in circulation. The residents effectively triangulated this 
information with further messages received from the mass media, local 
officials, and other people as well as with their own observations.
On 23 May PHIVOLCS released a hazard map that indicated the 
areas that were likely to be affected by pyroclastic flows, ash fall, and 
lahars (Punongbayan et al. 1996, 75). The hazard map became the basis 
of evacuation orders issued by the DCC on 7 April, 7 June, and 14–15 
June (Tayag et al. 1996, 92). The first evacuation order targeted residents 
within the 10-kilometer danger zone; the second order, those within the 
10- to 20-kilometer danger zone; and the third order, those within the 20- 
to 40-kilometer danger zone. Of the 234 respondents, 86 percent said they 
received an evacuation order; those that did not receive were mainly from 
the most distant danger zone. Most respondents received the order within 
the day or the day after it was issued—an indication of an efficient message 
delivery system (ibid.). However, there were a few who did not receive the 
warnings and others who received the warnings but did not appreciate the 
gravity of the situation, delaying defensive action or taking no action at all. 
In the end, more than 60,000 people heeded the warnings and fled to safety 
(Punongbayan et al. 1996, 67).
Of the 71 percent of the 234 respondents who had received warnings 
about the eruption, 81 percent took appropriate action by evacuating 
immediately (for those in the immediate danger zones) or taking other 
defensive action (among those in the middle and farthest danger zones) 
(Tayag et al. 1996, 94). However, eight respondents from within the 
10-kilometer danger zone who should have evacuated immediately merely 
took precautionary measures, while thirteen respondents from the 20- to 
40-kilometer danger zone overreacted by evacuating before they were 
ordered to do so. Nonetheless, of those forewarned, 13 percent ignored the 
warning or waited for the eruption to happen before they took action. Those 
who dallied thought that the eruption would not be so devastating or they 
could not bear the thought of leaving behind their possessions, with some 
Aeta fearing lowlanders would burn their crops and houses. After intensified 
ash emission on 9 June, many of those who had earlier refused to leave 
did flee—with external assistance remaining available to those who did not 
immediately follow the evacuation orders. Among the survey respondents, 
eventually all except 2 percent (five respondents) evacuated (ibid.).
The Aeta were the most severely affected, with about 7,800 families, or 
about 35,000 persons, forced to flee their homes in response to the warnings 
(Bautista 1996, 153). This move was a profound disruption and disorientation 
in their way of life. Many problems arose in the evacuation sites, resulting 
in nearly 1,000 deaths from diseases (Shimizu 2001, 26).14 An entire way of 
life was uprooted. 
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It appears that those among the Aeta who had no formal organization 
did not fare as well as those who had, such as the members of LAKAS. Many 
perished because of their refusal to heed the warning and evacuation orders, 
thinking erroneously that the eruption would be just like a strong typhoon 
(“para lang daw malakas na bagyo ‘yan”) (Tayag et al. 1996, 97). Instead of 
evacuating, some opted to shelter in what they called caves; most of them 
perished, with only a handful of survivors (Shimizu 2001, 61–68). The 
unorganized Aeta who evacuated found themselves scattered. In contrast, 
members of LAKAS were able to “critically assess the options opened to 
them” and in the end they maintained their bond; “the group was kept intact 
throughout the exodus” (Bautista 1996, 153). They also took responsibility for 
arranging some critical aspects of the logistics of their evacuation, including 
their own warning system (Fondevilla 1991, 63–64).15 As Tayag et al. (1996, 
96) concluded, “It is worth pointing out that all of the respondents contacted 
by the LAKAS organization showed the exemplary appropriate response. All 
(except one old man who chose to die rather than leave his home)16 prepared 
and evacuated promptly.”
communicating risk, Facing skepticism
LAKAS members recounted that volcanologists and local officials explained 
to them the hazards of Pinatubo’s eruption. The Aeta understood that what 
“drove them away” to flee to safety even while Pinatubo had not yet erupted 
was “ang bolkan” (the volcano) (cf. Fondevilla 1991, 57). 
A video on volcanic hazards was shown to help them visualize the 
situation. Aeta leaders explained to other Aeta the process of volcanic 
formation, and with the aid of the video they “became familiar with terms 
such as ashfall, pyroclastic flow and mudflow. They studied the initial hazard 
map released by Phivolcs showing the areas affected by these hazards in 
the last eruption of Pinatubo” (ibid., 62). They converted the volcanologist’s 
terminology to graspable concepts. As one Aeta man explained, “Apoy yung 
pyroclastic. Parang gasoline daw” (The pyroclastic is fire. Like gasoline, they 
say) (Shimizu 2001, 67).17 It was enough to make this man, and many others, 
understand the risks. As another Aeta stated, “Siguradong nakakamatay, sabi 
ng mga taga-PHIVOLCS” (It can certainly kill, said those from PHIVOLCS) 
(ibid., 64–65). Another Aeta narrated, 
Nagsimula ang usok noong Abril hanggang umabot ng Hunyo. Ang 
mga tao noon ay nangangamba dahil sa patuloy na pag-usok ng 
Pinatubo. Ang aming paniwala ay hindi ito puputok. Pero ayon sa 
pagsasaliksik ng PHIVOLCS ay tumitindi ang init ng Pinatubo kaya 
napilitan kaming lumikas bago ito pumutok. (ibid., 145)
Smoke began to appear on Pinatubo in April and continued until 
June. The people then were anxious because there was no let up to 
the smoke coming out of Pinatubo. Our belief was that it wouldn’t 
erupt. But based on the research of PHIVOLCS Pinatubo’s heat was 
intensifying, so we were compelled to evacuate before it erupted.
Still another Aeta recalled, 
Hindi pa namin pinapansin ang pagputok ng bulkan noong una dahil 
wala pa kaming karanasan. Nang pumunta na yung PHIVOLCS, doon 
kami nakipamalita at sinabing may posibilidad na pumutok. ‘Yon ang 
pinaniwalaan namin. (ibid., 218)
Initially we did not pay attention to the eruption because we never 
had such an experience. When PHIVOLCS arrived we sought for news 
and they said an eruption was possible. That was what we believed. 
Indeed, the Aeta deemed the information they obtained from PHIVOLCS 
“credible enough to be their basis for responding to the disaster” (Fondevilla 
1991, 48).
The video was strategic in convincing not only the Aeta but also 
government officials and residents in the lowlands who were skeptical that 
a volcano existed in their backyard and who did not believe “heretofore 
unknown geologists” (Punongbayan et al. 1996, 78):
Fortunately, we had an advance copy of a video entitled “Understanding 
Volcanic Hazards,” produced by the late Maurice Krafft for the 
International Association on Volcanology and Chemistry of the 
Earth’s Interior (IAVCEI). This video, made in response to the 
tragic misunderstanding and disaster at Nevado del Ruiz [in 1985 in 
Colombia where over 23,000 died], shows graphic examples of hot 
ash flows, ash fall, volcanic mudflows, large volcanic landslides, 
volcanogenic tsunami, lava flows, and volcanic gases. Superb, 
sometimes shocking, footage and a simple text illustrate the nature 
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of each phenomenon, how fast and far it travels, and its impact on 
people and houses. (ibid.)
The video was shown to as many people as possible, from the president and 
cabinet officials, governors, all the way down to local officials, teachers, 
students, and barangay residents. 
The team of volcanologists monitoring Pinatubo relayed information 
to the public through television interviews and face-to-face meetings 
with officials and residents. The volcanologists were deliberate about the 
intensive public education campaign they pursued, cognizant that they 
faced a question of credibility.
Residents and their leaders were understandably skeptical about 
phenomena that they had never seen and that they either could not or 
did not wish to imagine. Furthermore, we as scientists were largely 
unknown to those at risk. We were suspected of various faults, 
chiefly ignorance and utter foolishness, but also of trying to make 
sensational headlines, pursuing an academic agenda cloaked in 
concern, conducting counterinsurgency reconnaissance, being dupes 
of the U.S. military, raising funds for our agencies, land-grabbing, and 
more. (ibid., 79)
Confronted with skepticism, the scientists admitted that “we did not want 
to close minds through unduly aggressive messages; neither did we want to 
be so meek that we were ignored” (ibid.). They were “concerned about the 
serious consequences of a false alarm and whether we would have a second 
chance should the volcano not erupt as anticipated” (ibid., 81). Needless to 
say, it was a stressful time for the volcanologists. “Sleep was difficult, nerves 
were taut, and we were at our physical and emotional limits. We supported 
each other as best as we could with encouragement and humor” (ibid.). But, 
as Punongbayan et al. (ibid., 67, 79) put it, “Fortunately, Pinatubo gave us 
a brief but unmistakable warning” and, at the end of the day, the issue of 
credibility was “resolved by the volcano itself.”
Conclusion
As Bankoff (2003) rightly points out, disasters are embedded in social systems. 
But he also attributes to societies accustomed to disasters—“in the shadow of 
the volcano”— coping mechanisms that form part of so-called “cultures of 
disaster,” which simultaneously seem to mitigate disasters but also consign 
society to destruction and victimization, distrust and paralysis. As Bankoff 
(2004, 110) has asserted, “a fuller appreciation of the cultural perception 
of disaster may prove to be important in explaining both the Nature [sic] of 
the difficulties encountered and the frequency of failure that regularly greets 
even the most well-meaning agencies engaged in disaster preparedness and 
mitigation projects.” However, although popular conceptions of natural 
hazards may be inimical to mitigation in some contexts, the recent history of 
volcanic eruptions in the Philippines indicates that disasters ought to be seen 
from the perspective of historical contingency.
The victims of Taal’s eruption in January 1911 did not receive any 
advisory from the colonial state, even though some individuals had detected 
its possible occurrence and a small window existed to mount an evacuation 
of Volcano Island. Neither did the victims who had migrated to live on the 
island understand the signs that pointed to a cataclysm. Although settlement 
on the island was subsequently prohibited, volcanology did not become a 
major state initiative, especially as the country’s volcanoes remained inactive 
in the succeeding decades. Consequently, no state agency predicted the 
devastating eruption of Hibok-Hibok in December 1951; it was not even 
detected by the traditional means by which people could foresee an imminent 
eruption. Although not all volcanic eruptions could be predicted with high 
accuracy and advisories could not always be issued within reasonable time, 
the country sought to learn its lesson from Hibok-Hibok by establishing a 
state agency dedicated to volcanology in order to anticipate future eruptions. 
Since then, the country’s active volcanoes have been closely monitored and 
there have been no massive casualties from subsequent eruptions, such as 
the major eruption of Mayon in September 1984—giving rise to a different 
sort of “normalization,” one in which volcanologists have effected a working 
relationship with local officials and the people living adjacent to active 
volcanoes.
The eruption of Pinatubo in June 1991 was an extremely challenging 
situation for both the scientists and the unsuspecting public because the 
volcano had no recent eruptive history, as it had lain dormant for the previous 
half millennium or so. Identifying the existence of a hazard was a tricky 
process, and it was not possible to determine with reasonable certainty how 
much lead time the scientists possessed in issuing warnings to the public. Yet 
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at risk was a huge population of high density, particularly the Aeta who lived 
on Mount Pinatubo. Nevertheless, a potentially colossal disaster was averted. 
Crucially the Aeta with their nonscientific worldview served as the trigger that 
led to the monitoring of Pinatubo. Indigenous knowledge was transmitted to 
the volcanology agency through a local NGO and a resident missionary nun, 
indicating the strategic role played by this network. A relationship between 
the Aeta and the volcanologists emerged to their mutual benefit: information 
from the experts was deemed credible, even as the experts had to educate 
the Aeta about volcanoes. In the process, the Aeta did not have to jettison 
their cosmological beliefs to appreciate a natural hazard, take precaution, 
and flee to safety. They trusted the information coming from PHIVOLCS, 
but had to translate scientific terms to concepts already familiar to them—
proving effective in making them comprehend the risks of an eruption and 
prodding them to action. This instance runs counter to the generalized 
scenario of distrust and lack of confidence that Bankoff depicts concerning 
the government and the public in terms of warning systems.
Moreover, despite the use of even the most advanced instruments, 
warning systems are ultimately multifaceted human processes in close 
interaction with the natural world. Many lowlanders, including government 
officials, were skeptical, and initially there was contestation of the experts’ 
statements about Pinatubo. But the survivors processed the advisories they 
received from various sources that included the mass media, plus their 
own observations of what was going on in their environment, which led 
them to agree to an evacuation, even if such action was an emotional and 
logistical challenge. Here we find no societal paralysis. On their part, the 
experts underwent a challenging trajectory of understanding the restlessness 
of Pinatubo. No one knew at that time, but in hindsight all they had was 
a period of seventy days starting from the Aeta report on 2 April until the 
formidable eruption on 12 June. Once the scientists had established that an 
eruption was highly probable, they sought various means to communicate 
to the public their findings, which were capsulized in a hazard map and the 
warnings that were issued and disseminated through multiple pathways. In 
order to remain credible while pursuing a public education campaign, they 
were mindful of the delicate balance between aggressiveness and timidity in 
issuing warnings. 
Significantly the volcanologists did not hesitate in using a video that 
illustrated graphically the dangers of a volcanic eruption, thus enhancing 
the warning system with an audiovisual tool, which proved effective. The 
resolve to use the video was a lesson learned from the misunderstandings that 
attended the catastrophic eruption of Nevado del Ruiz in Colombia a few 
years before Pinatubo. In this sense, disaster preparedness, mitigation, and 
response had a cosmopolitan character, with a volcanic disaster in one part 
of the world becoming instrumental—as part of a complex set of contextual 
factors working together—in averting a colossal disaster in another part. 
Notes
A schematic version of this article was presented at the workshop “Toward Building a Regional 
Platform for Risk Reduction in Asia,” JSPS Core-to-Core Program, Center for Integrated Area 
Studies, Kyoto University, 22–23 July 2016. My deepest thanks go to Greg Bankoff for putting up 
with my quizzing. I am truly grateful that he read this manuscript, even at a late stage, and gave 
me feedback of inestimable value; I hope I have not been unfair to him and his work. I am also 
very grateful to Hiromu Shimizu for sending me a personal copy of his valuable The Orphans of 
Pinatubo. Thanks, too, to Kerby Alvarez for sharing with me his seminar paper on institutional 
volcanology. Last but not least, I am truly grateful to the four referees who made very insightful 
comments and suggestions, which guided me in improving this article. All remaining errors are 
my own.
1 I grew up in the Bikol region with the popular lore that Mayon erupts “every ten years” more or 
less. In this view the eruptions are simply a manifestation of the volcano’s secular periodicity. The 
notion I grew up with might have come from volcanologists, as it is found in Fisher et al. (1998, 
238) and Kondratyev et al. (2006, 21). Interestingly, Bankoff’s later study on Mayon Volcano’s 
eruptions in 1999–2000 mentions nothing about divine retribution (Bankoff and Hilhorst 2009).
2 The assertions in Cultures of Disaster (Bankoff 2003) that are examined in this article are 
reproduced in Bankoff 2004. So-called premodern or traditional values such as fatalism were 
debated in the 1960s and 1970s in connection with modernization theory. For the Philippines see, 
e.g., Guthrie 1971; Lynch 1973; Racelis Hollnsteiner 1973; Bulatao 1973.
3 Recently the issue of comprehensibility has resurfaced with the problems associated with 
communicating the risk of “storm surge,” a term little understood by the public until Typhoon 
Yolanda (international name: Haiyan) struck on 8 November 2013. See Esteban et al. 2016; 
Lagmay et al. 2015. But it was certainly not the first time that a storm surge had occurred, as 
there were twelve recorded events from 1986 to 1989. Until 2013 storm surges were said to 
be “not very destructive” (CDRC 1992, 58). Yolanda, as we all know, was a massive disaster. 
To deal with the issue of comprehensible warnings, storm surge and other terms in PAGASA’s 
weather bulletins have been translated to the Filipino language, an endeavor likely to generate 
new problems in comprehension. See PDI 2016.
4 The prevarication disappears in Bankoff (2004, 111), which ends with the confident assertion, 
“In some societies, natural hazards occur with such historical frequency that the constant 
threat of them has been integrated into the schema of both daily life and attitude to form what 
can be called ‘cultures of disaster’.”
5 Recall the controversy that attended Oscar Lewis’s (1959) thesis on the “culture of poverty” 
starting in the 1960s.
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6 In the following year’s annual report, the section on the Philippine Weather Bureau was a one-
sentence paragraph that read, “The Philippine Weather Bureau has continued to perform, with 
its usual high degree of efficiency, its very valuable work of seasonably sending out warnings 
of the approach of the violent storms which periodically sweep through the Archipelago” (US 
Philippine Commission 1912b, 119).
7 In Worcester’s account, what is now referred to as “imperial Manila” lacked confidence in the 
provinces whence came supposedly highly exaggerated reports on disasters.
8 See Hargrove (1991, 145–47) for a list of Taal’s eruptions from 1572 to 1977. A list of “destructive 
volcanic events” shows that, after Taal’s 1911 eruption, mudflow was observed in Mayon in 
1915, but no major events happened until Hibok-Hibok began its series of eruptions in 1948 
(CDRC 1992, 73).
9 For a newsreel on Hibok-Hibok’s 1951 eruption, see British Pathé (2014) available on YouTube.
10 That Hibok-Hibok’s eruption was the impetus for this legislation is acknowledged by Filipino 
volcanologists. See Tayag and Punongbayan 1994, 2.
11 Republic Act 766, sec. 2, specified that “The Commission on Volcanology shall be composed 
of the Director of Mines, the Director of the Weather Bureau, the Chairman of the Section 
on Geology, Seismology and Volcanology of the National Research Council, the head of the 
Department of Geology, University of the Philippines, and a representative of the Geological 
Society of the Philippines” (Philippine Congress 1952, 3215).
12 A 96-year-old Aeta woman said, “Sa tanda kong ito wala pa akong alam na pumutok ang Pinatubo” 
(Despite my advanced age, I have never known of Pinatubo erupting) (Shimizu 2001, 108).
13 As Punongbayan et al. (1996, 81) admitted, “The most serious shortcoming of our warnings was 
that, even though the hazard maps anticipated ash fall, we treated it more as a nuisance than 
as a deadly hazard. We did not give adequate warning that the accumulated ash would be much 
heavier than expected because of rain from the typhoon and did not anticipate that roofs which 
were already burdened by ash would be strained even more by earthquakes during the latter 
stages of the eruption.”
14 The complex cultural, social, and physiological problems associated with the dislocation of the 
Aeta require an extended discussion that is not possible in the space of this article. For Aeta 
testimonies, see Shimizu 2001, 141–56; Fondevilla 1991. Cf. Seitz 1998; Macatol and Reser 
1999–2000; Gaillard 2006a, b; Marler 2011; Bernstein and Dominy 2013.
15 However, as Shimizu (2001, 29–30) notes, “Soon after the eruption, Mr. Paylot Cabalic, one of the 
leaders of LAKAS, wanted to become independent and self-determined, free from the patronizing 
advice, instruction, and guidance of the sisters who had been working earnestly for LAKAS since 
its establishment.” Cabalic formed a separate organization, signaling the crystallization of Aeta 
ethnic consciousness and empowerment, which was an unforeseen consequence of Pinatubo’s 
eruption, as Shimizu (2001) argues.
16 In fact, this elderly man who was part of the LAKAS community had evacuated at an early stage, 
but he longed to return to his fields. After one month in the evacuation center he was so agitated 
as to demand to be allowed to return to his home on Pinatubo, where he died. He is said to have 
made the appeal: “Kung gusto niyo para hindi ako magalit . . . ibalik ninyo ako doon sa dating 
lugar. Di bale na kung pumutok iyong Pinatubo. Kung puputok ang Pinatubo ako ang kasama ng 
ating lupa at halaman na matatabunan. Ako ang kasamang mamamatay ng halaman doon sa Mt. 
Pinatubo” (If you like so that I won’t get angry . . . bring me back there in the former place. It 
doesn’t matter if Pinatubo erupts. If Pinatubo erupts I will be buried together with our land and 
plants. I will die together with the plants there on Mount Pinatubo) (Shimizu 2001, 58).
17 Geologists explain that “Pyroclastic flows are extremely hot (up to 10000C), often incandescent 
and turbulent blasts of volcanic fragments (boulders, pebbles, sand and dust) and hot gases that 
sweep along close to the ground at great speed” (Tayag and Punongbayan 1994, 3).
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